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ABSTRACT How does the historical legacy

of agriculture affect democratic traditions in
contemporary societies? This paper provides
empirical evidence that inherent crop yield
and democracy exhibit an inverted U-shaped
relationship. This finding is supported by
cross-country data from up to 147 countries,
186 pre-colonial societies, and the U.S. states.
The relationship thus exhibits a highly persistent pattern. Crop yield is measured by kilocalories per hectare per year under rain-fed
conditions, which has the advantage of being
highly exogenous. The hump-shaped relationship holds up to a battery of robustness tests.
(JEL O11, O13)

1. Introduction
Since the Neolithic Revolution, agriculture
has historically been the dominant sector and
remains so today in many developing economies. How does this legacy affect democratic
traditions in contemporary societies? This
paper contributes to the literature by showing
that the level of democracy is associated with
the inherent productivity of land. In particular, crop yield and democracy form a robust
inverted U-shaped relationship.
Stylized facts provide strong motivation
for our analysis. Galor and Özak (2016) provide an index of potential crop yield in million
kilocalories per hectare per year.1 Countries
1 Galor and Özak (2016) utilize data from the Global
Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) project of the Food and Agriculture Organization, and caloric content of various crops
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with intermediate levels of crop yield (such as
Austria, New Zealand, and the United States)
tend to be democracies. In contrast, countries
both in the bottom decile of the distribution
of crop yield (including Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and Qatar) and in the top decile of the distribution (including Cuba, Swaziland, and Tanzania) tend to be autocracies or exhibit low
levels of democracy (as measured by Polity2
for 1961–2015 by Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2015).2 In Swaziland, for example, land
tenure is central to politics (Levin 1987). The
allocation of land (“Swazi Nation Land”) by
the king (an absolute monarch) through the
chiefs is a prominent feature of royal rule. Essentially, the Swazi king is the elite holding
power over the agricultural sector.
Using cross-country data from up to 147
countries, we first establish a hump-shaped
relationship between crop yield and the average level of democracy from 1961 to 2015.
Countries endowed with the least productive
crop land tend to have low levels of democracy, similar to those countries with the highest crop yields. Democracy peaks in the intermediate range of crop yield. This result holds
up to a host of robustness checks.
Second, we present results using the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) assembled by Murdock and White (1969). The
SCCS provides a representative sample of
world cultures in 186 societies in precolonial
times, with minimum influence of the European colonizers. Our two measures of democfrom U.S. Department of Agriculture Nutrient Database for
Standard Reference.
2 Appendix Table A1 provides more details. The table includes no democracy except Norway. While many countries
in the bottom decile have ample oil reserves, the correlation
between potential crop yield and (1) oil production/GDP,
and (2) oil reserves, in our dataset are –0.39 and –0.27, respectively.

S Appendix materials are freely available at http://le.uwpress.org and via the links in the electronic version of
this article.
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racy reflect the process of succession and existing executive constraints. We find that the
inverted U-shape existed before the colonial
era. This suggests a highly persistent pattern.
Third, we analyze democracy at the state
level in the United States, the oldest democracy. As for the measure of democracy, we follow Vanhanen (2000) and utilize voter turnout
in parliamentary and presidential elections as
a reflection of active participation of citizens
in the selection of the executive. The humpshaped relationship holds also at the state
level in the United States.
Existing theories are unable to fully explain the hump-shaped relationship established in this paper. However, they jointly help
facilitate our understanding and suggest that
persistent inequality of income may be an important mechanism for the empirical pattern
discovered here. We start with a discussion
of areas with low crop yield under rain-fed
conditions, which tend to be arid or semi-arid.
In such areas, irrigation is necessary for crop
production. Irrigated agriculture exhibits substantial scale economies. This raises the size
of firms and creates barriers to entry. Bentzen,
Kaarsen, and Wingender (2017) argue that a
history of irrigation-based agriculture has created a resource curse. Economic and political
elites who controlled the use of water engaged
in rent-seeking activities, and high levels of inequality emerged. These elites have throughout history been unwilling to allow democracy to develop. On the other hand, suppose
land was not irrigated (due to low inherent
land fertility). In such areas people tended to
engage in long distance transportation (e.g.,
the Bedouins on the Arabian Peninsula, the
Berbers across the Sahara, and various tribes
along the Silk Road) or in violent raiding and
conquering of agricultural areas (Haber and
Menaldo 2011). In these areas, democratic
traditions were unlikely to develop.
At the middle range of crop yield, independent (often cereal producing) family farms
tended to emerge with a more equal distribution of income (Sokoloff and Engerman
2000; Engerman and Sokoloff 2005a, 2005b).
Small-scale farmers favored public goods
such as the protection of property rights, enforceable contract law, and quality education.
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These factors facilitated the creation of democratic traditions.3
At sufficiently high crop yields, land provides large rents. Plantation crops such as
bananas, cocoa, and sugar are often favored.
Such crops are highly conducive to large
scale production, owned by a small elite and
associated with intense rent-seeking, slavery,
and inequality (Wright 1970; Engerman and
Sokoloff 1997, 2005a, 2005b; Sokoloff and
Engerman 2000; Easterly 2007). Lagerlöf’s
(2009) theoretical model argues that sufficiently high land productivity causes the elite
to utilize slavery in production. This enables
the elite to pay workers less than their marginal product but necessitates costly guards.
Fenske (2013) provides empirical evidence
of a positive correlation between land quality
and slavery in preindustrial Africa.4 Wright
(1970) argues that the cotton-slavery sector in
the highly fertile U.S. South was associated
with a high degree of concentration of income
and wealth. The economic and political inequalities produced by rent-seeking and the
institution of slavery have persisted for centuries (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Sacerdote
2005; Nunn 2008a, 2008b; Miller 2012).5
An advantage of Galor and Özak’s (2016)
potential crop yield measure is its high degree
of exogeneity. Using a measure of potential
calorie output facilitates comparisons across
countries and sharpens the focus on the histor3 Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, democratization
occurred in Western societies despite rising inequality associated with industrialization, because the elite wanted
to avoid social unrest or a revolution. Haber and Menaldo
(2011) argue that democracy is more likely to persist in areas with a broad distribution of human capital, and moderate
rainfall levels led to a broad distribution of human capital
through a greater prevalence crop types suitable for family
farms. Family farm production yielded incentives to set up
institutions that protect private property and make intergenerational investments in human capital.
4 Lagerlöf’s (2009) model also suggests that at high levels
of agricultural productivity, slavery disappears because an
associated high population density (building on a Malthusian argument) makes free labor cheaper than slaves. This
model thus predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship between slavery and agricultural productivity. However, in
practice the downward sloping part of this inverted U may
occur out of sample.
5 Appendix Figure A1 illustrates a positive correlation between our measure of crop yield and the fraction of slaves in
28 New World countries in 1750.
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ical importance of calories in most of human
history. This paper contributes to the literature
by establishing a robust nonlinear empirical
relationship between historical agricultural
crop production and contemporary democratic institutions. We believe this is a more
general finding than that discussed by, for example, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), who
provide case studies of crops such as wheat
and sugar, not rigorous evidence.
Our findings are robust to a number of
checks. These include using several alternative democracy and crop yield measures,
controlling for the potential confounding effects of historical institutions, accounting for
various linear and nonlinear effects of early
development, allowing for various effects of
contemporary development and social cleavages, among others. Additionally, we employ
a battery of parametric and nonparametric
methods to further establish our finding of a
robust quadratic relationship.

2. Empirical Approach and Data
Regression Model
In order to evaluate the influence of potential
crop yield on the degree of democracy, we estimate the following regression model:
β0 + β1cropyieldi + β2cropyieldi2
democracyi =
+ β3controlsi + i ,

[1]

where democracyi is the average level of democracy in country i over the period of study,
cropyieldi is the potential crop yield in country i, controlsi is a vector of control variables
included in the regression to minimize the
possibility of getting spurious estimates, and
i is the country-specific error term.
Equation [1] represents a reduced-form
specification that aims to examine the influence of potential crop yield on democracy. β1
and β 2 are the coefficients of interest.
Data
This section describes the data for the main
variables. The summary statistics and a correlation matrix are provided in Appendix Tables A2 and A3, respectively.
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Democracy Measures
Our baseline sample used in the cross-country analysis consists of data for up to 147
countries. Our main measure of democracy is
the average value of the Polity2 score for the
period 1961–2015. The data come from the
Polity IV project (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers
2015). The database provides a democracy
classification for all independent countries
with a total population greater than 0.5 million in 2015 (167 countries). Polity2 classifies
regimes on a 21-point scale ranging from –10
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated
democracy).6
We focus on the post-1960 period, as most
of the former European colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and
East Asia had gained independence by 1960.
This permits us to explore the effect of potential crop yield on democracy, while reducing
the possibility that the results are confounded
by the colonial powers’ direct influence on
their former colonies’ domestic institutions.
However, in the robustness analysis we test
our model using data spanning alternative
time periods starting from 1800. Alternative
democracy measures from Freedom House
(2016) are also used in robustness checks.
Potential Crop Yield
The independent variable of interest is an
index of potential crop yield, measured in
millions of kilocalories per hectare per year.
The data are obtained from Galor and Özak
(2016), who construct a dataset using the
Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) project of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). GAEZ supplies global yield and
growth cycle estimates for 48 crops (listed in
Appendix Section 5) in grids with a cell size
of 5 feet × 5 feet (approximately 100 km2).
GAEZ supplies crop yield estimates for each
crop based on three alternative levels of input (high, medium, and low) and two feasible
sources of water supply (rain-fed water supply
and irrigation). The dataset provides potential
yield estimates for each crop in each agroclimatic grid, while accounting for the effect of
temperature and moisture on crop growth.
6 Appendix Figure A2 shows the distribution of Polity2
(average score 1961–2015) across the world.
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The index of potential crop yield is constructed using a low level of inputs and rainfed agricultural cultivation methods (see
Appendix Section 5 for more details). This
reflects farming practices prevalent during
the early stages of preindustrial development.
Furthermore, the FAO dataset provides two
alternative projections of potential yield estimates for each crop based on agroecological constraints and agroclimatic conditions,
respectively. The potential crop yield based
on agroecological constraints can be affected
by human intervention, while the potential
crop yield based on agroclimatic conditions
is arguably unaffected by human intervention. To mitigate concerns of reverse causality, this index is computed from the potential
crop yield based on agroclimatic conditions
under rain-fed low-input agriculture. These
estimates of potential crop yield account for
the effect of temperature and precipitation
on the growth of the crop. In addition to climate-related “workability constraints,” these
estimates also consider the impact of pests,
disease, and weeds on yields. The FAO dataset also provides estimates of the growth cycle
for each crop, capturing the number of days it
takes for each crop from planting to maturity.
Each crop yield in the GAEZ data (measured in tons per hectare per year) is converted
by Galor and Özak (2016) into caloric yield
(millions of kilocalories per hectare per year).
This represents the variation in nutrition across
crops, which facilitates a comparison of crop
yields. The U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Nutrient Database for Standard Reference provides data on the caloric content of
various crops. Using these measures, the estimated average regional crop yield reflects the
average regional levels of two variables, crop
yield and crop cycle, among crops that maximize the caloric yield in each cell. Our analysis focuses on averages across cells within
each country. We include only cells where the
maximum potential crop yield is positive, following Galor and Özak (2016).
The crop yield index addresses the limitations of other available weight-based agricultural yield indices. For example, the land productivity index constructed by Ramankutty et
al. (2002) does not reflect the fact that equally
suitable land can have a large variation in crop
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yield, since caloric-intensive crops may not
be cultivated in some regions (see Galor and
Özak 2015).
It is also worth highlighting that we use potential crop yield as a proxy for actual crop
yield. Actual crop yield is likely to be affected
by human intervention, which may result in
spurious estimates. Moreover, autocratic regimes may potentially manipulate crop yield
data or not share actual data with international agencies such as the FAO. Furthermore,
GAEZ provides actual crop yield data for the
year 2000 only, which does not provide sufficient exogeneity. Using potential crop yield
data, however, is not without limitations. Potential sources of measurement errors include
limited spatial weather data from developing
countries, local variation in land quality, and
differential data quality across different areas.
As a sanity check, we regress (mean) actual
crop yield on (mean) potential crop yield.
These variables are significantly correlated,
conditioning on the baseline geographic influences.7 Hence, while there is no reliable way
to tackle the issue of measurement errors, this
simple analysis provides some credence to using the potential crop yield data.
Control Variables
Some geographic features may potentially confound the association between crop yield and
the extent of democracy. In our regressions, we
therefore control for absolute latitude, terrain
ruggedness, elevation, variation in elevation,
landlockedness and distance to nearest waterway. We also include continent dummies to
account for any omitted variable bias due to
time-invariant continent-specific geographical, cultural, or historical characteristics.

3. Main Results
Baseline Regression Results
Table 1 presents our findings for the influence of crop yield on the extent of democracy.
7 Appendix Figure A3 shows the distribution of potential
crop yield (millions of kilocalories per hectare per year). The
bottom decile of countries has a crop yield below 908, while
the top decile has a yield above 11,474 (see Appendix Table
A1).
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Table 1
The Effect of Crop Yield on Democracy (Dependent Variable: Polity2)

Crop yield

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Baseline
(5)

0.20**
(2.58)

1.64***
(6.33)
–1.49***
(–5.60)

1.45***
(6.72)
–1.17***
(–5.22)
0.46***
(7.22)

7,031
147
No
0.18
4.76 [p = 0.00]

7,892
147
No
0.37
3.85 [p = 0.00]

1.48***
(6.54)
–1.24***
(–5.39)
0.48***
(7.40)
–0.08
(–0.68)
–0.03
(–0.18)
–0.00
(–0.00)
–0.05
(–0.53)
–0.15
(–1.47)
7,625
147
No
0.40
4.18 [p = 0.00]

1.04***
(4.05)
–0.91***
(–3.46)
0.27**
(2.06)
–0.05
(–0.47)
0.20
(1.41)
–0.17
(–1.58)
–0.08
(–1.10)
–0.09
(–1.22)
7,286
147
Yes
0.54
2.83 [p = 0.00]

Crop yield squared
Absolute latitude
Terrain ruggedness
Elevation (mean)
Elevation (standard deviation)
Landlocked
Distance to waterways
Optimal crop yield
Observations
Continent fixed effects
Adjusted R-squared
Test for inverted U-shape

147
No
0.04
—

Note: This table presents standardized coefficients for the effect of average crop yield (measured in millions of kilocalories per hectare per
year) on Polity2 over the period 1961–2015. All specifications use an intercept term, but it is not reported for brevity. The continent dummies are
Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, Oceania, and South America. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses.
**, *** Significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test for an inverted U-shape uses Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) approach.

Column (1) reports a positive and significant
association between potential crop yield and
the extent of democracy. In column (2) we
add potential crop yield squared along with
linear potential crop yield. The result suggests
a potentially inverted U-shaped association
between the extent of democracy and potential crop yield, with a positive coefficient for
potential crop yield and a negative coefficient
for the quadratic term. The quadratic pattern
improves the fit, as both linear and quadratic
terms are statistically significant and the adjusted R2 increases.
In column (3), we include absolute latitude,
which captures some climatic influences. Low
latitudes are often associated with poor soil
quality, highly variable rainfall, and a high incidence of debilitating tropical diseases (Olsson and Hibbs 2005). While absolute latitude
helps explain the extent of democracy, the influence of crop yield on democracy remains intact. Our results remain robust to the inclusion
of additional geographical controls in column
(4), including terrain ruggedness, average elevation, elevation variation, landlockedness,

and distance to waterways. Finally, we account
for continent fixed effects in column (5). The
coefficients of the linear and quadratic crop
yield variables remain statistically significant
at the 1% level. We choose the specification in
column (5) as our baseline model and use it for
the robustness analysis below.8
Adding the linear and quadratic effects
along with other baseline controls, democracy
reaches a maximum at a potential crop yield
equal to 7,625 in column (4). The optimal potential crop yield declines marginally to 7,286
after controlling for continent fixed effects
in column (5). The optimal level of potential
crop yield for the United States equals 7,589,
close to the democracy-maximizing yield in
the baseline model.
It should be highlighted that a significant
number of observations are located on either
side of the peak of the inverted U. Examples
of democracies (Polity2 score equal to 10)
8 Appendix Figure A4 illustrates the estimated inverted
U-shaped relationship between the potential crop yield and
average democracy.
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with crop yields close to the democracy-maximizing level are Austria (6,815), New Zealand
(6,538), and the United States (7,590) (crop
yields in parentheses). A total of 20 countries
in our sample have average Polity2 scores
equal to +10, and two countries have average
scores equal to –10. This artificial censoring
on the extreme values, imposed by design of
the Polity2 measure, may affect our estimates,
since we cannot observe the true value for part
of the dependent variable and its probability
density function becomes noncontinuous beyond the range. In an additional analysis, we
therefore repeat the estimations reported in
Table 1 using Tobit estimations (also known
as censored regression estimations). The results are reported in Appendix Table A4. The
results show that our findings are not driven
by any arbitrary censuring of the Polity2 data.
Evidence of an Inverted U-Shaped
Relationship
We have established that the linear and quadratic terms are statistically significant after
controlling for baseline controls. We utilize
several statistical tests and approaches to establish a hump-shaped relationship, and to
exclude the possibility of a higher-order nonlinear relationship between contemporary democracy and potential yield.
First, we follow Lind and Mehlum (2010),
who improve upon Sasabuchi’s (1980) test for
an inverted U-shape. The test results are reported at the bottom of Table 1 and indicate
that the slope of the estimated curve is increasing for low values of potential crop yield,
but decreasing for high values. Moreover, the
optimal yield value associated with a peak
lies within the data range. Using our baseline
specification in Table 1 (last column) as an illustration, the test of the positive slope at the
lowest value of crop yield (0) yields a t-statistic of 4.047 (p = 0.000). In contrast, the test of
the negative slope at the maximum value of
potential crop yield (17,998) gives a t-statistic
of –2.834 (p = 0.000). Overall, the test rejects
the null hypothesis that the underlying relationship is monotonic at the 1% level of significance (t-statistic = 2.830; p = 0.002), thus
providing evidence supporting our inverted
U-shape hypothesis. The results are consis-
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tent for columns (2) to (4). Note that we also
obtain the same result (unreported) when the
sample is restricted to only non-OECD countries (t-statistic = 2.440; p = 0.008).
Second, while the results above provide
evidence for the presence of a U-shaped relationship, doing so does not eliminate the possibility of a higher-order nonlinear relationship
between contemporary democracy and potential crop yield. In particular, Simonsohn (2016)
argues that imposing a quadratic relationship
and interpreting it as evidence of a U-shaped
association may be misleading. Rather, we
should first identify a threshold and then use a
“two-line” approach to estimate two separate
linear models for observations above and below the threshold. In our baseline model (last
column, Table 1), democracy is predicted to
reach a maximum at the potential crop yield of
7,286 million kilocalories per hectare per year.
Following Simonsohn (2016), we estimate the
linear relationship both below and above this
threshold. The two linear models presented in
columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table A5 confirm the presence of a statistically significant
hump-shaped relationship between democracy
and potential crop yield.
Third, to allow for the possibility of the
presence of a higher-order relationship, we
include a cubic term in the model specification along with the quadratic relationship.
This provides a simple test for the presence of
a possible S-shaped relationship. The results
presented in column (3) of Appendix Table
A5 reject the presence of an S-shaped relationship. Overall, the results of these various
methods show that the quadratic relationship
between the level of democracy and potential
crop yield is robust.9

4. Robustness of Results
Are the Results Robust to Institutions and
Early Development?
This section accounts for institutions developed centuries ago, and other early devel9 We provide the results of the Lind-Mehlum test in all
subsequent tables (where applicable). This does not imply
that we favor this approach relative to the other two, but is
due to the ease of reporting.
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opment indicators. These may possibly have
confounding effects on the extent of contemporary democracy. The results are reported in
Table 2. Column (1) reports the findings after
accounting for dummies for the major categories of the origin of colonizers in our global
sample: Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, and
other European colonizers. In column (2), we
restrict our sample to countries that were colonized by a European colonial power only. The
results in columns (1) and (2) indicate that colonial history does not affect the finding of an
inverted U-shape.
Olsson (2009) argues that a longer duration
of colonization has had a positive influence
on contemporary democracy. Column (3) accounts for this effect. The inverted U-shaped
pattern survives, although the coefficient sizes
decrease. The duration of colonization has a
positive influence on democracy, consistent
with Olsson (2009).
The European colonizers transferred their
legal systems to the colonies, which remained
after independence. Moreover, these legal
systems served as role models for countries
that were never colonized. In column (4) we
account for British common law, French civil
law, German civil law, Scandinavian law, and
socialist law legal origins. Hall and Jones
(1999) argue that social infrastructure, including institutions and government policies, are
endogenously determined by geography and
other regional factors. These may be captured
by language. They utilize the share of European languages spoken. In a similar vein,
Easterly and Levine (2016) propose that countries’ economic characteristics were shaped
by the share of the population of European
descent during the colonial era. In column
(5), we account for the possible confounding
effects of these two channels. The number of
observations falls to 118, as data on European language shares are available for fewer
countries. The early disease environment and
population health conditions have been shown
to affect the historical development of institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
2003). We account for disease environment in
column (6) by using a measure of pathogen
stress. Our main result holds.
Next, we focus on five measures of early
development that may act as possible con-
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founders. These are all strongly correlated
with the current economic development, social capital, and the quality of institutions.
First, Ang (2013b) provides evidence that the
early development of a state influences the development of contemporary institutions. We
use a measure of state antiquity (statehood
experience) provided by Putterman (2012) for
the period 1–1500 CE. This index reflects the
existence of a government, how much territory
it covered, and whether the government was
indigenous or externally imposed. The period
1–1500 CE is divided into 50-year periods,
discounted by 5% for each half century. Column (7) suggests that the inverted U-shaped
relationship survives after accounting for state
antiquity.
Second, we control for the timing of the
agricultural transition (Neolithic revolution),
namely, the year a country started sedentary
agricultural practices, consumed mostly cultivated foods, and abandoned the hunter-gatherer lifestyle. The timing of this transition
helps explain, for example, income levels,
comparative financial development, and technological advancement (Putterman 2008; Ang
2013a, 2015). Accounting for the agricultural
transition in column (8) leads to no qualitative
changes in the main results.
Our third measure of early development is
the estimated population density in 1500 CE
(column 9). The Malthusian theory suggests
that higher agricultural productivity leads to
higher fertility, lower mortality, and higher
population growth, thus hampering economic
development. Next, Olsson and Hibbs (2005)
establish that initial biogeographic conditions
influenced contemporary levels of economic
development via an early transition to agriculture. Furthermore, Ahlerup and Olsson (2012)
show that the duration of human settlement in
a region is positively associated with the level
of ethnic diversity. This influences contemporary development. We account for these two
indicators in columns (10) and (11), respectively. The relevant inverted U-shaped association continues to hold.
Column (12) accounts for the influence of
(predicted) genetic diversity. Genetic diversity was determined tens of thousands of years
ago as humans migrated out of Africa (Ashraf
and Galor 2013). The literature suggests that

State antiquity
(1500)
Years since
agricultural
transition
Population
density (1500),
log

Crop yield
squared
Colonial history
(F-statistics)
Duration of
colonization
Legal origin
(F-statistics)
European
population (%)
European
language (%)
Pathogen stress

Crop yield

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

–0.02
(–0.23)

(table continued on following page)

–0.26**
(–2.07)

1.12***
1.65***
1.00**
1.13***
1.20***
1.08***
0.86***
1.04***
1.01***
0.99***
1.12***
0.99***
0.57*
(4.17)
(4.16)
(2.63)
(4.54)
(3.68)
(4.24)
(3.09)
(3.89)
(3.70)
(3.53)
(4.31)
(3.82)
(1.97)
–0.98*** –1.49*** –1.00**
–0.97*** –1.01*** –0.85*** –0.81*** –0.97*** –0.92*** –0.97*** –0.97*** –0.89*** –0.61**
(–3.63)
(–3.74)
(–2.62)
(–4.13)
(–3.22)
(–3.42)
(–2.84)
(–3.71)
(–3.27)
(–3.54)
(–3.70)
(–3.44)
(–2.24)
1.63
2.63
[p = 0.16] [p = 0.04]
0.32***
(2.66)
8.51
[p = 0.00]
0.16*
0.28***
(1.97)
(2.99)
0.14*
(1.67)
–0.24*
0.02
(–1.67)
(0.13)
–0.06
–0.01
(–0.74)
(–0.09)
–0.22*
–0.44***
(–1.79)
(2.70)

(1)

Table 2
Accounting for Institutions and Early Development (Dependent Variable: Polity2)
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Yes
6,983

Yes
7,260

Yes
6,578

Yes

84
0.46

(3)

Yes
7,421

Yes

147
0.619

(4)

Yes
7,549

Yes

118
0.552

(5)

Yes
7,981

Yes

132
0.588

(6)

Yes
6,993

Yes

131
0.512

(7)

Yes
6,866

Yes

144
0.547

(8)

Yes
7,174

Yes

137
0.512

(9)

(10)

Yes
6,814

Yes

129
0.533

–0.30**
(–2.04)

Yes
7,417

Yes

139
0.543

0.04
(0.33)

(11)

Yes
7,060

Yes

–0.30
(–1.14)
147
0.539

(12)

(13)

Yes
6,045

Yes

–0.15
(–0.80)
–0.04
(–0.31)
0.40
(1.39)
113
0.60

Former
Global
Global
Global
Global
Global
Global
Global
Global
Global
Global
Global
colonies
2.99
3.20
2.45
3.52
2.67
2.55
2.46
3.31
2.76
3.30
3.00
2.94
1.97
[p = 0.00] [p = 0.00] [p = 0.01] [p = 0.00] [p = 0.00] [p = 0.01] [p = 0.00] [p = 0.00] [p = 0.00] [p = 0.00] [p = 0.00] [p = 0.00] [p = 0.02]

Yes

Yes

Global

95
0.439

(2)

147
0.545

(1)

Note: This table presents standardized coefficients for the effect of (mean) crop yield (measured in millions of kilocalories per hectare per year) on Polity2 over the period 1961–2015. All specifications
use an intercept term, but it is not reported for brevity. The continent dummies are Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, Oceania, and South America. Baseline controls used are absolute latitude,
terrain ruggedness, elevation (average), elevation (variation), landlockedness, and distance to waterways. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses.
*, **, *** Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The test for an inverted U-shape uses Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) approach.

Test for inverted
U-shape

Human
settlement
Genetic diversity
(predicted)
Observations
Adjusted
R-squared
Continent
dummies
Baseline controls
Optimal crop
yield
Sample

Biogeography

Table 2
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genetic diversity plays an important role in
the determination of contemporary productivity, economic development, ethnic conflicts,
and social hierarchy (Ashraf and Galor 2011,
2013; Arbatli et al. 2015; Ashraf, Galor, and
Klemp 2015; Galor and Klemp 2015).
We account for the various potential confounders simultaneously in column (13). The
number of observations declines to 113. However, even after controlling for these early
development indicators, the hump-shaped
relationship between potential crop yield and
democracy survives.
Next, the recent literature suggests that
the association between the early development indicators and contemporary economic
development may be more complex than previously believed (see, e.g., Ashraf and Galor
2013; Borcan, Olsson, and Putterman 2016).
A concave relationship may be more accurate. Appendix Table A6 provides estimates
of alternative specifications where we add
squared terms for most of the early development indicators discussed earlier. The linear
and squared crop yield coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications. State history and population density
appear to have concave effects on democracy.
In contrast, disease environment, years since
agricultural transition, and biogeography
(which all had a linear influence in Table 2)
show no significant effects when their squared
terms are added. The coefficients of human
settlement and genetic diversity remain insignificant. The “optimal crop yield” estimates
remain fairly stable in Table 2, with an average deviation of 5% from the baseline model
estimate (Table 1, column 5).
Are the Results Robust to Contemporary
Development and Social Cleavages?
According to Lipset (1959), a higher per capita GDP improves the level of democracy.
Column (1) in Table 3 accounts for (log of)
per capita GDP in 1960 (just before the start
of the timing of the outcome variable). The
sample size declines to 95 countries (due to
the unavailability of data for some countries
in the Penn World Table). While the coefficient of (log of) GDP per capita has a positive
sign, it is statistically insignificant.
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Next, we study the influence of human capital on democracy. We measure human capital
by the amount of schooling. The influence of
education on democracy is currently unsettled
in the literature.10 Column (2) controls for the
average years of schooling in 1960. Our results suggest that average schooling in 1960
is complementary to potential crop yield and
appears to promote democracy. We also use
several alternative measures of human capital,
including newspaper circulation per capita,
following Haber and Menaldo (2011), and
two human capital stock measures from Lee
and Lee (2016). The estimates in columns
(1) to (3) of Appendix Table A7 indicate that
our results are not influenced by the choice of
measure for human capital.
Several studies highlight a negative association between the production of oil and democracy (e.g., Barro 1999; Ross 2001; Tsui
2011; Van der Ploeg 2011), consistent with
the resource curse hypothesis. Multiple countries in our sample produce oil or have large
reserves. To mitigate any confounding effects,
we account for average oil income as a proportion of GDP over the 1961–2015 period.
Oil income has a negative association with democracy in column (3). A series of additional
robustness tests account for the resource curse
due to having more than one-third of export
income made up by oil (Appendix Table A7,
column 4). We use a dummy for OPEC countries (Appendix Table A7, column 5) and
control for the presence of oil or diamonds
(Appendix Table A7, column 6). The baseline
results remain robust.
While the main objectives of foreign aid
are to promote economic growth and improve
10 On the one hand, education promotes a “culture of
democracy” according to Dewey (1916). Similarly, Lipset
(1959) argues that educated people understand the need
for norms of tolerance; they make more rational electoral
choices as education broadens people’s outlook. Lipset
(1959) suggests that education is “close to being a necessary
condition” for democracy. Castelló-Climent (2008) finds a
positive empirical association between education and democracy (see also Murtin and Wacziarg 2014). In contrast,
Acemoglu et al. (2005) find no effect of education on democracy. They argue that the statistical associations between
education and democracy in previous studies disappear
when time and country fixed effects are introduced. However, they do not reject the possibility of a causal relationship
between education and democracy in the long term.

Language
fractionalization
Religion
fractionalization

Ethnic fractionalization

Religion (F-statistics)

Foreign aid (% of GDP)

Oil production/GDP

Years schooling (1960)

GDP/capita (1960), log

Crop yield squared

Crop yield

(1)

0.89***
(2.78)
–0.78**
(–2.38)
0.18
(1.11)

Table 3

0.45***
(4.85)

0.97***
(3.26)
–0.86***
(–2.99)

(2)

–0.12**
(–2.11)

0.94***
(3.76)
–0.83***
(–3.32)

(3)

0.02
(0.26)

1.37***
(4.45)
–1.15***
(–3.63)

(4)

3.40
[p = 0.02]

0.99***
(3.67)
–0.96***
(–3.65)

(5)

–0.10
(–0.97)
0.20*
(1.68)
0.02
(0.31)

0.89***
(3.51)
–0.76***
(–3.03)

(6)
1.06***
(4.31)
–0.94***
(–3.70)

(7)
1.10***
(4.30)
–0.96***
(–3.67)

(8)
0.85***
(3.18)
–0.72***
(–2.67)

(9)

Accounting for Social Cleavages and Other Effects (Dependent Variable: Polity2)
(10)
0.55*
(1.87)
–0.61**
(–2.23)

(11)

(12)
1.11***
(4.41)
–0.95***
(–3.73)

(table continued on following page)

1.09***
(4.49)
–0.96***
(–3.85)
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95
0.57
Yes
Yes
7,928
1.88
[p = 0.03]

(1)

124
0.605
Yes
Yes
7,158
2.60
[p = 0.01]

(2)

145
0.558
Yes
Yes
7,216
2.77
[p = 0.00]

(3)

121
0.416
Yes
Yes
7,577
2.81
[p = 0.00]

(4)

146
0.562
Yes
Yes
6,572
3.36
[p = 0.00]

(5)

140
0.565
Yes
Yes
7,432
2.44
[p = 0.01]

(6)

(7)

146
0.550
Yes
Yes
7,182
3.06
[p = 0.00]

–0.08
(–1.35)

145
0.541
Yes
Yes
7,350
2.99
[p = 0.00]

–0.05
(–1.06)

(8)

147
0.543
Yes
Yes
7,459
2.15
[p = 0.02]

0.15*
(1.82)

(9)

147
0.552
Yes
Yes
5,724
1.87
[p = 0.03]

–0.28**
(–2.59)

(10)

145
056
Yes
Yes
7,214
3.18
[p = 0.00]

–0.11**
(–1.87)

(11)

–0.02
(–0.24)
146
0.55
Yes
Yes
7,430
2.97
[p = 0.00]

(12)

Note: This table presents standardized coefficients for the effect of (mean) crop yield (measured in millions of kilocalories per hectare per year) on Polity2 over the period 1961–2015. All specifications
use an intercept term, but it is not reported for brevity. The continent dummies are Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, Oceania, and South America. Baseline controls used are absolute latitude,
terrain ruggedness, elevation (average), elevation (variation), landlockedness, and distance to waterways. Religion accounts for Protestant, Roman Catholic, Muslim, and Hindu. Robust t-statistics are given
in parentheses.
*, **, *** Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The test for an inverted U-shape uses Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) approach.

Share of agriculture in
GDP
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Continent dummies
Baseline controls
Optimal crop yield
Test for inverted
U-shape

Trade openness

Potential Irrigation

Crop yield variation

Emigration rate

Birthplace diversity

Table 3
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institutional quality in recipient countries,
recent studies have questioned the effectiveness of foreign aid infusion (e.g., Svensson
2000; Rajan and Subramanian 2007; Nunn
and Qian 2014). Column (4) accounts for average foreign aid (net official development aid
as a fraction of the recipient country’s GDP)
over the period 1961–2015. Recent studies
suggest that religion and political regime may
have an association (e.g., Woodberry 2012).11
Column (5) controls for the percentage of the
population that follows Protestantism, Roman
Catholicism, Islam, and Hinduism. The relevant inverted U-shaped relationship remains
robust. Next, we control for the potentially
confounding effects of population heterogeneity. Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003)
construct measures of diversity including ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization,
utilized in column (6). Only language fractionalization has a significant effect.
Alesina, Harnoss, and Rapoport (2016)
propose a diversity index for the place of birth
of immigrants. With increased migration, the
cultural norms and practices of a region may
change. Similarly, Docquier et al. (2016) propose that the emigration rate is associated with
the development of institutions in the country
of origin. We account for birthplace diversity
and emigration rate in columns (7) and (8).
Next, including a measure of the variation in
potential crop yield in column (9) suggests a
positive association with democracy, contrary
to expectations. Bentzen, Kaarsen, and Wingender (2017) argue that in arid and semi-arid
regions, irrigation is necessary and exhibits
scale economies. The elite have had control
over water and restricted the development of
democracy. The coefficient on irrigation potential in column (10) takes the expected negative sign and is significant. Finally, in columns
(11) and (12) we control for trade openness
11 Protestant missionaries may have spread moral and cultural values that facilitated the development of democracy.
For instance, the emphasis on reading the bible in vernacular
languages promoted education and the printing press, foundations of modern democracy (Woodberry 2012). In contrast, Barro (1999) and Karatnycky (2002) argue that Islam
promotes cultural values that are impediments to democratic
regimes. While there is a perception of a strong association
between Islam and authoritative institutions, survey data
provide contradictory results (Rowley and Smith 2009).
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and the contribution of agriculture to GDP, respectively. No qualitative changes occur in the
inverted U-shaped association between potential crop yield and democracy. Similar to the
earlier findings, the estimates of the “optimal
crop yield” are found to be fairly stable when
additional controls are considered.
Are the Results Robust to Alternative
Measures?
Many countries have historically experienced
sharp changes in the level of democracy. The
choice of time period of study may consequently affect our results. We therefore vary
the time period over which the average democracy level is measured. In column (1) of
Table 4, we use all available Polity2 data since
1800. The inverted U-shaped relationship between crop yield and democracy remains robust. The relevant coefficients are significant
at the 1% level and are qualitatively similar
to those in our baseline results in Table 1. The
fit of the model declines by roughly one-third.
However, being able to explain 36% of the
average cross-country variation in democracy
over more than two centuries is still notable,
in our view. Column (1) supports our argument that the inverted U-shaped relationship
holds in the very long run.
In columns (2) through (4), the starting year
is 1901, 1931, and 1991, respectively. While
the inverted U-shape survives in columns (2)
and (3), the squared potential crop yield term
becomes insignificant at conventional levels
in column (4). This may be due to the third
wave of democratization, which saw a sudden
adoption of democracy by a number of countries after the end of the cold war (Russett et
al. 1993). We also utilize various subsamples
of data from the nineteenth century; the subsample periods are 1800–1850, 1800–1900, and
1851–1900 in columns (5) through (7). The
inverted U-shaped relationship holds at the
10% level for sample period 1800–1900, and
1851–1900. However, the result does not hold
for the 1800–1850 period. One possibility is
that the number of observations has fallen dramatically, and another is that the Polity2 data
for the earlier period are less reliable.
While Polity2 is the most widely used
measure of democracy in the literature, it is

Land Economics

Observations
Continent dummies
Baseline controls
Adjusted R-squared
Inverted U-shape
test

Crop yield squared

Crop yield

1.04***
(3.65)
–0.94***
(–3.17)
147
Yes
Yes
0.36
2.65
[p = 0.00]

1.01***
(3.77)
–0.91***
(–3.34)
147
Yes
Yes
0.46
2.82
[p = 0.00]

1.03***
(3.93)
–0.92***
(–3.47)
147
Yes
Yes
0.46
2.92
[p = 0.00]

0.71**
(2.41)
–0.48
(–1.62)
146
Yes
Yes
0.49
0.93
[p = 0.18]

0.86
(1.17)
–1.15
(–1.34)
42
Yes
Yes
0.26
1.17
[p = 0.13]

0.99*
(1.72)
–1.23*
(–1.96)
49
Yes
Yes
0.29
1.72
[p = 0.05]

1.08*
(1.79)
–1.26*
(–1.96)
49
Yes
Yes
0.20
1.79
[p = 0.04]

(table continued on following page)

0.98***
(4.35)
–0.89***
(–3.76)
147
Yes
Yes
0.58
3.15
[p = 0.00]

AutocAve
(1961–2015)
[reverse coded]
1.07***
(–3.41)
–0.90***
(2.93)
147
Yes
Yes
0.43
2.38
[p = 0.01]
DemocAve
(1961–2015)
Polity2
(1851–1900)
Polity2
(1800–1900)
Polity2
(1800–1850)
Polity2
(1991–2015)
Polity2
(1931–2015)
Polity2
(1901–2015)
Polity2
(1800–2015)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)
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Dependent variable
(Period)

12 While these variables seem largely similar to Democ
and Autoc (they contain similar information), their values
are not identical to those of Democ and Autoc. For example, the United States is assigned a democracy value of 7
and an autocracy value of 3 for the year 1800 in the Polity
IV database. Hence, the resulting Polity2 score is 4 for that
year. According to our approach, Democ is assigned 1 but
“Polity2 > 5” is assigned 0.

Table 4

a composite score that may mask the degree
of institutional democracy. To mitigate such
concerns, we utilize several alternative measures of institutional democracy. First, we
create a measure using Democ from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers
2015). Democ takes values between 0 and 10,
where a higher value indicates a higher level
of institutional democracy. The average over
the years 1961–2015 is labeled DemocAve.
Similarly, a higher value of Autoc from the
Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers
2015) indicates a higher level of institutional
autocracy. This variable is reverse coded so
that higher values of Autoc imply greater
democracy. AutocAve is the average Autoc
value for the years 1961–2015. The results for
using DemocAve and AutocAve are presented
in columns (8) and (9), respectively. The findings remain intact.
Next, Polity2 is an ordinal variable taking
values from –10 through +10. A higher positive (more negative) value indicates a higher
level of democracy (autocracy). However, the
boundary between democracy and autocracy
is not exact. We therefore construct measures
of democracy and autocracy using Polity2 that
differentiate strong democracy from autocracy. For the democracy measure, we assign a
value of 1 if Polity2 is above 5 in a particular
year and 0 otherwise. We then calculate the
mean value for 1961–2015. This represents
the fraction of years that a country has democracy during this time period. The fraction
of years that a country has autocracy is calculated using the same approach, but based on
the criterion that Polity2 is below –5. These
two outcome measures are used in columns
(10) and (11), respectively. The hump-shaped
influence of potential crop yield on democracy remains intact.12
Freedom House (2016) also provides data
for a large number of countries from 1973 onward on civil liberties and political rights. The
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147
Yes
Yes
0.55
2.86
[p = 0.00]

0.95***
(4.17)
–0.86***
(–3.49)

Polity2 > 5
(1961–2015)

147
Yes
Yes
0.35
2.01
[p = 0.02]

1.01***
(2.92)
–0.84**
(–2.49)

Polity2 < –5
(1961–2015)
[reverse coded]

(11)

147
Yes
Yes
0.59
1.77
[p = 0.03]

0.66***
(2.85)
–0.58**
(–2.26)

Freedom
House
(1973–2015)

(12)

147
Yes
Yes
0.60
1.74
[p = 0.04]

0.67***
(2.85)
–0.58**
(–2.24)

Democ-Boix
et al. (2012)
(1961–2015)

(13)

147
Yes
Yes
0.59
1.85
[p = 0.03]

Democ
Cheibub et
al. (2010)
(1961–2015)
0.69***
(3.07)
–0.56**
(–2.43)

(14)

147
Yes
Yes
0.48
1.01
[p = 0.15]

0.57**
(2.59)
–0.40*
(–1.73)

Checks&balances
Keefer (2012)
(1961–2015)

(15)

145
Yes
Yes
0.52
1.67
[p = 0.04]

–0.61**
(–2.42)

0.80***
(3.19)

Polity2
(1961–2015)

(16)

146
Yes
Yes
0.51
2.10
[p = 0.02]

0.62***
(2.88)
–0.57**
(–2.55)

Polity2
(1961–2015)

(17)

0.45***
(2.77)
–0.48***
(–2.83)
119
Yes
Yes
0.51
2.77
[p = 0.00]

Polity2
(1961–2015)

(18)
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Note: This table presents standardized coefficients for the effect of potential crop yield (measured in millions of kilocalories per hectare per year) on various measures of democracy. The dependent variable
in columns (1) to (7) is average Polity2 score over various periods. DemocAve and AutocAve in columns (8) and (9) are average Democ and Autoc scores, respectively. The dependent variables in columns
(10) and (11) are the fraction of years that has Polity2 score greater than 5, or less than –5, respectively. The dependent variables in columns (9) and (11) are transformed appropriately so that a higher value
indicates a higher value of democracy. The dependent variable in column (12) is the average of civil liberties and political rights over the period 1973–2015. The dependent variables in columns (13) and (14)
are alternative measures of democracy developed by Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2012) and Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), respectively. The dependent variable in column (15) is the number of checks
on executive averaged over 1961–2015. Column (16) uses ancestry-adjusted crop yield and its square as independent variables. The independent variable in column (17) is soil suitability from Ramankutty
et al. (2002). The independent variable in column (18) is the potential crop yield per capita in 1500. Baseline controls used are absolute latitude, terrain ruggedness, elevation (average), elevation (variation),
landlockedness, and distance to waterways. All specifications use an intercept term, but it is not reported for brevity. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses.
*, **, *** Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The test for an inverted U-shape uses Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) approach.

Land suitability
square
Crop yield per
capita
Crop yield per
capita squared
Observations
Continent dummies
Baseline controls
Adjusted R-squared
Test for inverted
U-shape

Crop yield
(migration
adjusted)
Crop yield squared
(migration
adjusted)
Land suitability

Crop yield square

Crop yield

Dependent variable
(Period)

(10)

Table 4
Alternative Measures of Democracy and Crop Yield (continued)
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two indices have a correlation coefficient of
0.97. We transform these measures so that a
higher value indicates the presence of a more
democratic regime. Column (12) uses the
mean of these two indices, averaged over the
years 1973–2015, as the outcome variable.
The inverted U-shaped relationship remains
unbroken.
Moreover, we utilize three additional measures of democracy. First, Boix, Miller, and
Rosato (2012) compile a dichotomous measure of democracy. A country is defined as
democratic if it satisfies the conditions for both
contestation and participation. Specifically,
political leaders are chosen through free and
fair elections, and the level of suffrage is above
a threshold level. Next, Cheibub, Gandhi, and
Vreeland’s (2010) dichotomous measure of
democracy focuses on how incumbent leaders
are removed. Lastly, Keefer (2012) creates a
measure of checks and balances. The results
using these three additional measures are reported in columns (13) through (15). Potential
crop yield and these three alternative measures of democracy continue to show inverted
U-shaped associations, with the linear and
squared term coefficients remaining statistically significant in all specifications.
In order to mitigate concerns that our results are driven by the choice of crop yield
measure, we use several alternative measures.
First, significant cross-country migration has
occurred since the sixteenth century. In particular, a large proportion of the current populations in the New World migrated from the
Old World. The migrants carried with them
their knowledge, cultural traits, and institutional values (Putterman and Weil 2010). This
cross-border exchange and dissemination of
ideas may have impacted the formation of
democratic regimes. We therefore account
for the original location of the current populations’ ancestors by premultiplying our crop
yield measures with the world migration matrix constructed by Putterman and Weil (2010)
to create the ancestry-adjusted potential crop
yield measures. The adjusted measures in
column (16) take the country of origin of the
immigrants in each country’s population into
account so that we can shed some light on
whether the diffusion of ideas via migration,
apart from the actual location of crop yield,

May 2020

also matters. The inverted U-shaped association between ancestry-adjusted potential crop
yield and the extent of democracy endures.
Second, in column (17) we use the land
suitability index developed by Ramankutty et
al. (2002). This index ranges from 0 to 1 and
reflects suitability for farming based on soil
quality and climate. The results are robust to
this alternative measure of crop yield. Finally,
we study the effect of potential crop yield per
capita. The literature discusses the relevance
of the land-labor ratio for institutional outcomes (e.g., Lagerlöf 2009; Fenske 2013).
The Malthusian theory argues that a higher
level of crop yield per person should result in
higher population density. Column (18) uses
potential crop yield per person. The inverted
U-shaped relationship remains intact.
Overall, it appears that the identified association between potential crop yield and democracy is quite robust to different measures
of crop yield. Reassuringly, Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) test rejects the null hypothesis
that the underlying relationship is monotone
or U-shaped at conventional levels of significance in all columns, except columns (4),
(11), and (15).
Is the Democracy Index a Proxy for Risk
Aversion?
Matranga (2017) argues that higher levels of
climate seasonality induced risk-averse nomadic hunter-gatherers to invent sedentary
agriculture, with more stable food sources.
Seasonality and risk aversion may also have
caused other cultural traits. To account for the
possibility that democracy has been adopted
by more risk averse populations, we add measures of risky behaviors to the baseline controls
in Appendix Table A7. Our three measures of
risky behavior come from the country averages
on three questions in the World Values Survey (waves 5 and 6) (Inglehart et al. 2014).
We construct the risk avoidance indices using
individual-level response data from this survey
(waves 5 and 6) for the following questions:
“living in secure surroundings is important to
this person (A191)” and “adventure and taking risks are important to this person (A195).”
We further compile another index (wave 6) on
things done for reasons of security (H003),
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including “didn’t carry much money,” “preferred not to go out at night,” and “carried a
knife, gun, or other weapon.” Results after controlling for the confounding effects of these
indices of risky behavior (or risk aversion) are
reported in columns (7) to (9) in Appendix Table A7. The number of observations decreases
by more than half. However, the hump-shaped
relation between potential crop yield and the
level of democracy remains intact.
Distance to the Frontier
The literature shows that humans learn from
and trust others who are similar to themselves
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009). An exogenous measure of barriers to diffusion of
ideas between societies is genetic distance
(Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009). Genetic distance measures the time elapsed since two
societies had a common ancestor. Using genetic distance, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009)
show that income difference between societies can be explained by genetic distance from
the technological frontier. Similarly, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) use a measure of
frequencies of blood types as genetic distance
to explain the variation in income across countries. Could the variation in democracy across
countries reflect different cultural traits?
Could genetic distance constitute a barrier to
the diffusion of democracy, whereas the oldest
democracy the United States is the frontier?
To account for these possible confounding effects, we control for both genetic distance and
blood distance to the United States in columns
(10) and (11) in Appendix Table A7. These
variables are found to have no effect on the
level of democracy.
Are the Results Robust to Restricted
Sample Estimation?
In this section, we restrict the sample using
different criteria. First, the inverted U-shaped
influence of potential crop yield on democracy may possibly be driven by a particular
region. To mitigate such concerns, we sequentially drop all observations belonging
to a particular continent. We then reestimate
our baseline model in the last column of Table
1. Column (1) in Appendix Table A8 restates
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this baseline result using the global sample.
Columns (2) through (7) report the results
from dropping one continent at a time. The inverted U-shape remains robust in all six models. Next, the New World’s institutions were
largely set up by the migrants from the Old
World. Many characteristics of early development did not exist in the New World. When
we exclude New World countries in column
(8), the results remain intact in the Old World
subsample. Finally, in column (9) we restrict
the sample to 57 industrialized countries, defined as those with shares of agriculture below
the global mean during the period 1991–2000.
The decline of the importance of agriculture
is likely to be most acute in these economies.
Both the linear and quadratic crop yield coefficients are significant at the 1% level, despite the smaller sample. The results suggest
a high degree of persistence in the effect of
crop yield.
Pre-1500 Potential Crop Yield and Trade
Costs
We have utilized post-1500 potential crop
yield data. An alternative would be pre-1500
potential crop yield data. There is a strong
correlation between these two measures
(0.92), due to most sample countries having
added only a few new crops during the Columbian exchange. Here, we explore whether
the introduction of new crops affects our main
hypothesis.
Many areas in the New World were
sparsely inhabited, and a large fraction of the
indigenous population died after contact with
the European explorers (Koch et al. 2019).
Koch et al. (2019) argue that the total 1600
CE population in the Americas was 6.1 million. Thus, the population currently residing
in New World countries has had little exposure to the pre-1500 potential crop yield. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 utilize the Old
World subsample to study the relationship
between contemporary democracy (average
Polity2 over 1961–2015) and the pre-1500
and post-1500 potential crop yields, respectively. We note that the pre-1500 data may be
of relatively lower quality. The proposed relationship holds in both cases. The pre-1500
coefficients in column (1) exhibit somewhat
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Table 5
Pre-1500 versus Post-1500 Potential Crop Yield and Democracy
Dependent variable
Potential crop yield (pre-1500)
Potential crop yield square
(pre-1500)
Potential crop yield

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Polity2
(1961–2015)
1.24***
(4.44)
–1.16***
(–4.13)

Polity2
(1961–2015)

Polity2
(1961–2015)

Democracy
(1500 CE)
1.51***
(5.13)
–1.45***
(–5.14)

0.97***
(3.53)

1.39***
(3.92)

–0.80***
(–2.90)

–1.25***
(–3.46)
0.12
(0.80)
Yes
Yes
102
0.32
2.83
[p = 0.002]

(post-1500)
Potential crop yield square
(post-1500)
Navigational distance
Continent fixed effects
Baseline controls
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Test for inverted U-shape

Yes
Yes
123
0.55
3.91
[p = 0.000]

Yes
Yes
123
0.54
2.25
[p = 0.013]

Yes
Yes
125
0.56
5.03
[p = 0.000]

Note: This table presents standardized coefficients for the effect of potential crop yield (measured in millions
of kilocalories per hectare per year) on Polity2 over the period 1961–2015 (column 1–3) and on a measure of
democracy in 1500, using data from Acemoglu et al. (2008) in column (4). Baseline controls used are absolute
latitude, terrain ruggedness, elevation (average), elevation (variation), landlockedness, and distance to waterways. All specifications use an intercept term, but it is not reported for brevity. Robust t-statistics are given in
parentheses.
*** Significance at the 1% level. The test for an inverted U-shape uses Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) approach.

greater levels of significance than the post1500 coefficients in column (2).
The dispersion of both new crops and democracy may be related to trade costs. We account for contemporary trade openness in Table 3, column (11). However, the trade costs
involved with the Columbian exchange in the
fifteenth to sixteenth centuries are more relevant. To the best of our knowledge, no reliable
data are available for bilateral trade costs for
this period. However, assuming that imports
of seeds and plants were free of customs duties during this period, the cost of trade should
largely be reflected by distance.13 We control
for navigational distance between Camaret-sur-mer, France, and the closest port of
historic importance in each country. We disregard routes going through the Suez or Panama canals. Column (3) in Table 5 indicates
that the trade costs did not play a significant
role in explaining the relationship between
13 Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2008) find that between
1870 and 2000, a 1 standard deviation rise in distance raised
trade costs by 0.4 standard deviations.

the potential crop yield and contemporary
democracy. Our main result remains robust.
Do the Results Hold for 1500 CE?
To emphasize that the level of crop yield has
had a long-term influence on democracy, we
construct a measure of democracy in 1500 CE
using data from Acemoglu et al. (2008).14 We
repeat the Table 1 baseline model using pre1500 potential crop yield data and the 1500
CE democracy measure. The results survive,
as reported in column (4), Table 5. This suggests that the relationship between potential
crop yield and democracy can potentially be
interpreted in a causal sense rather than simply reflecting a correlation.
Are the Results Robust to Specific Crops,
Precipitation, and Temperature?
Easterly (2007) uses data on the suitability of
cereals versus plantation crops to document
14 Acemoglu et al. (2008) compile a dataset on the change
in the level of democracy over 1500–2000.
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that cereal production causes greater income
equality and quality institutions, as discussed
by Engerman and Sokoloff (Engerman and
Sokoloff 1997; Sokoloff and Engerman
2000). Thus, these crops may have confounding effects. Moreover, Haber and Menaldo
(2011) find an inverted U-shaped relationship
between precipitation levels and democracy.
They argue that rainfall levels affect the suitability for growing crops of different storability. Storable crops create incentives to trade,
protect property rights, and invest in human
capital. Rainfall is also an important determinant of actual crop yield. Columns (1) to (3)
in Appendix Table A9 report the results from
including different cereal and plantation crops
suitability measures used by Easterly (2007).
Columns (4) to (5) present results that control
for average precipitation and its square.
Moreover, Haber and Menaldo (2011) use
the average precipitation around a country’s
largest city. They argue that institutions tend
to develop first in the main city and then diffuse around the country. Following Haber and
Menaldo (2011), we construct an average precipitation index and two restricted cubic precipitation splines around the largest city for
1980–1989.
One alternative to using polynomials to
check for nonlinearity is to use splines. The
main advantage of this approach is that it
involves a nonlinear transformation of the
explanatory variable prior to running regressions. The splines are therefore not influenced
by the dependent variable. Following Haber
and Menaldo (2011), we construct a restricted
cubic spline for the logs of precipitation. The
underlying assumption is that precipitation is
linear before the first and after the last knot,
but forms a cubic piecewise polynomial shape
between these knots. Our results remain intact
in column (6) in Appendix Table A9. Similar
to Haber and Menaldo (2011), the first spline
of precipitation is positive, while the second
spline is negative but insignificant.
Finally, since temperature levels should
also affect crop suitability, in column (7) in
Appendix Table A9 we add a measure of average temperature for the period 1961–1990.
One of the measures of cereal to plantation
crop suitability (column 2) and the linear effect of precipitation in all models (columns 4,
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5, and 6) are significant. The presence of precipitation measures attenuates the influence of
potential crop yield, indicating that precipitation is complementary to potential crop yield.
Overall, the crop yield coefficients remain
significant in all cases in Appendix Table A9.

5. Further Evidence
Evidence from Precolonial Indigenous
Societies
This section utilizes data from 186 precolonial societies. The data are available from
the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS),
compiled by Murdock and White (1969).
The SCCS provides a representative sample of world cultures “for the earliest period
for which satisfactory ethnographic data are
available or can be constructed” (Murdock
and White 1969, 340). The aim is to avoid the
influence of European colonizers on these societies (Murdock and White 1969).15
The SCCS database provides information
on two important political dimensions in precolonial societies. The first relates to how the
process of “local political succession” occurred. The database categorizes the process
of succession into nine different categories,
namely, no headmen or council, by appointment, seniority, divination, informal consensus, electoral process, patrilineal, matrilineal,
and hereditary without personal qualifications. We consider the process of local political succession to be democratic if it took
place through either “informal consensus” or
“electoral process,” otherwise not. Second,
the SCCS provides information on the executive constraints. This could be either a council, the “executive and council,” or “plural executives,” or a “single leader.” We consider a
society to be democratic when the executive
power rests with an “executive and council”
(similar to a parliament in contemporary rep15 The possibility exists that these societies’ cultures had
been influenced by contacts with Europeans. The years of
observation are in the nineteenth or early twentieth century.
Murdock and White (1969, 329) suggest that “cultural independence of each unit in terms of historical origin and cultural diffusion could be considered maximal with respect to
the other societies in the sample.”
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Table 6
Using Preindustrial Societies Data from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample

Dependent Variable
Crop yield
Crop yield squared
Observations
Baseline controls
Region fixed effects
R-squared
Language clusters
Test for inverted U-shape

(1a)
Local
Political
Succession

(1b)
Local
Political
Succession

(1c)
Local
Political
Succession

(2a)
Concentration
of Power in
Executive

(2b)
Concentration
of Power in
Executive

(2c)
Concentration
of Power in
Executive

0.59**
(2.35)
–0.62**
(–2.69)
137
No
No
0.03
40
2.32
[p = 0.01]

0.73***
(2.82)
–0.74***
(–3.34)
137
Yes
No
0.04
40
2.79
[p = 0.00]

0.69***
(2.72)
–0.69***
(–2.80)
137
Yes
Yes
0.16
40
2.63
[p = 0.00]

0.73**
(2.49)
–0.62**
(–2.60)
68
No
No
0.05
24
2.48
[p = 0.01]

1.48***
(4.08)
–1.20***
(–3.90)
68
Yes
No
0.16
24
3.48
[p = 0.00]

1.43**
(2.76)
–1.14**
(–2.27)
68
Yes
Yes
0.24
24
1.78
[p = 0.04]

Note: This table presents standardized coefficients for the effect of crop yield (measured in millions of kilocalories per hectare per year) on two
alternative definitions of democracy from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS). The baseline controls used are absolute latitude, roughness of elevation, elevation (average), elevation (variation), and distance to a coast. Latitude of the societies is from the SCCS database, while
other controls—roughness of elevation, elevation (average), elevation (variation), and distance to a coast—are generated from G-Econ (2008) using a 200 km radius around each society. The region dummies are sub-Saharan Africa, Middle Old World, Southeast Asia/Insular Pacific, Sahul,
North Eurasia/Circumpolar, Northwest Coast of North America, North and West of North America, Eastern Americas, Mesoamerica/Andes, and
Far South America, as described in the SCCS database. All specifications use an intercept term, but it is not reported for brevity. Standard errors
are clustered at the language group level. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses.
**, *** Significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test for an inverted U-shape uses Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) approach.

resentative democracies), rather than with
“plural executives” or a “single leader.”
We follow the baseline specification in column (5) in Table 1. Using the SCCS database,
the unit of analysis is at the society level. The
SCCS database does not contain information
about the land area covered by these precolonial societies. While the centroid of each society is obtained from the dataset, measuring
their precise locations may involve errors. Following Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013),
we use a buffer zone of 200 km around the
centroid in order to extract the independent
variables and other control variables from
other datasets. The (mean) crop yield for a
society is thus calculated using the circular
land area around the centroid with a radius of
200 km. This is combined with the global crop
yield dataset based on a raster image, made
available by Galor and Özak (2015, 2016). We
also control for geographic variables in the
analysis such as distance to the coast, elevation, variation in elevation, and roughness of
variation, which are generated from G-Econ
(2008) by, again, using a radius of 200 km
around the centroid of each society.
The empirical findings are reported in
Table 6. Columns (1a) to (1c) use the “local

political succession” measure of democracy,
while columns (2a) to (2c) study the “concentration of power in executive.” Columns (1a)
and (2a) report the unconditional influence of
crop yield on these two variables. The next
columns include all baseline controls, and the
last columns control for regional fixed effects.
The evidence suggests an inverted U-shaped
influence of crop yield on our measures of
democracy in precolonial societies. The full
model specifications in columns (1c) and (2c)
are able to explain 16% and 24%, respectively,
of the variation in democracy in precolonial
societies.
Evidence from the State Level
In this section, we address the possibility
there may be some unobserved effects that are
correlated with democracy and the measure
of crop yield at the national level. We address
this concern by running regressions at the
state level for the United States.
Wright (1970) provides evidence that in
1860, the cotton (the only cash crop) producing South (Gini index equal to 57.7)
had larger farms compared to six Northern
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states.16 Within the South, the region with the
most fertile soil type (alluvial soil), had the
highest Gini index of 63.5.17 Moreover, for
every soil type region, an index of concentration is greater for farm value than for area
(improved acreage). In the alluvial region, the
largest 10% of farms had 50.6% of agricultural land, but the most valuable 10% of farms
owned 64.1% of total farm value. The average index of concentration of farm value in
the South was 67.8 in the year 1860, while it
was 78.0 in the alluvial region. The concentration of slaveholdings in the alluvial region
was roughly equal to the average in the South,
however. Wright (1970) argues that high-quality land was very expensive, necessitating cotton (cash crop) production and the purchase of
slaves; thus, all sizes of farms in highly fertile
areas owned slaves. Wright (1970) concludes
that the effect of the cotton-slavery sector was
to raise the level of concentration of income
and wealth. In our view, this has led to an agriculturally based resource curse within the
United States.
One difficulty involved with estimating
our model at the state-national level is the
absence of a readily available index of democracy. Fortunately, a major component of
composite democracy indices is the level of
active participation of citizens in the selection of the executive (Vanhanen 2000). Most
democratic theorists assert that without significant citizen involvement, the democratic
process falls short of its goals. Therefore, participation by citizens in competitive elections
is a distinctive feature of democratic politics
(Powell 1982). In a high-quality democracy,
citizens must have equal participation rights
(Banducci, Donovan, and Karp. 2004; Paxton et al. 2003). Lijphart (1997) views low
voter turnout as an indicator of unequal and
socioeconomically biased political participation, a serious problem for democracy. Solijonov (2016) argues that high voter turnout
16 The Northern states for which data are available are
(Gini index within parentheses) Illinois (43.6), Iowa (44.0),
Indiana (45.2), Minnesota (34.2), Ohio (43.8), and Wisconsin (45.2).
17 The alluvial soil region is located along the Mississippi
River in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas; along the
Red River in Louisiana; and in three Texas counties at the
mouth of the Brazos River.
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is often a sign of the vitality of a democracy.
In contrast, low turnout is usually associated
with voter apathy and mistrust of the political
process. Low electoral turnout is either inherently bad for democracy, or calls legitimacy
into question by suggesting a lack of representation of a certain group (Franklin 1999).
Following Powell (1982) and Diamond and
Morlino (2005), we use voter turnout rates
as the measure of citizen’s participation in
the governance of their country, and thus as a
measure of the degree of democracy.
We use voter turnout as a fraction of the
total electorate as a measure of the electorate’s participation across states in the United
States. We use average presidential election
voter turnout for the period 1980–2012. We
reuse the baseline regression model in the last
column of Table 1 but replace country-level
variables by state-level variables, including
the geographical control variables.
Table 7 presents our findings for the influence of crop yield on democracy at the state
level. Column (1) documents unconditional
influences, while we add latitude and other
baseline controls in columns (2) and (3), respectively. The inverted U-shaped association
between potential crop yield and democracy
survives at the state level in the United States.
Then, we account for the four regional and
nine divisional fixed effects in columns (4)
and (5), respectively, to account for any unobserved effects. There is no qualitative change
in our findings. Next, we control for the fraction of Blacks and Hispanics in the population
in columns (6) and (7), respectively. While
the nineteenth amendment granted women the
right to vote in 1922, in some states this right
had already been extended beforehand. In column (8) we account for whether a state had
granted voting rights to women before 1922.
These controls have negative signs, as expected, though all are insignificant. However,
the inverted U-shape remains intact.
We also account for cultural values, including religious adherence, estimates of the
population attending a place of prayer, and
family ties. These account for confounding
effects of informal institutions on democracy.
Family ties can influence the quality of institutions (Alesina and Giuliano 2014). Next, we
account for the age dependency ratio, school

(1)

(2)

51
No

No
No
0.58
3.15
[0.00]

No
No
0.25
2.04
[0.02]

1.36***
(3.16)
–1.43***
(–3.27)
0.65***
(6.43)

51
No

1.42**
(2.05)
–1.80***
(–2.75)

(3)

No
No
0.60
2.80
[0.00]

51
Yes

1.68***
(2.81)
–1.63***
(–3.60)
0.76***
(4.25)

(4)

Yes
No
0.62
2.49
[0.00]

51
Yes

1.93***
(3.21)
–1.76***
(–3.36)
0.68***
(3.70)

(5)

Yes
Yes
0.63
1.59
[0.06]

51
Yes

2.08***
(3.00)
–1.71***
(–2.80)
0.71***
(3.07)

(6)

Yes
Yes
0.63
1.37
[0.08]

51
Yes

2.03***
(2.99)
–1.62**
(–2.58)
0.71***
(3.36)
–0.17
(–0.97)

(7)

Yes
Yes
0.62
1.66
[0.05]

51
Yes

–0.11
(–0.86)

1.79*
(2.02)
–1.58**
(–2.25)
0.61**
(2.22)

(8)

Yes
Yes
0.63
1.81
[0.04]

51
Yes

–0.17
(–1.04)

2.33***
(3.04)
–1.95***
(–2.94)
0.74***
(3.04)

(9)

Yes
Yes
0.62
1.62
[0.06]

51
Yes

–0.05
(–0.32)

2.09***
(3.02)
–1.72***
(–2.86)
0.71***
(3.11)

(10)

Yes
Yes
0.62
1.62
[0.06]

51
Yes

0.07
(0.28)

2.19***
(2.82)
–1.85**
(–2.66)
0.76**
(2.50)

(11)

Yes
Yes
0.64
1.29
[0.10]

51
Yes

0.16
(1.09)

2.05***
(3.22)
–1.65**
(–2.56)
0.77***
(3.92)

(12)

Yes
Yes
0.63
1.59
[0.06]

51
Yes

–0.14
(–0.81)

1.98***
(2.95)
–1.64***
(–2.79)
0.75***
(2.96)

(13)

Yes
Yes
0.62
1.64
[0.06]

0.10
(0.62)
51
Yes

2.04***
(2.79)
–1.70***
(–2.76)
0.68**
(2.67)

Land Economics

Note: This table presents standardized coefficients for the effect of crop yield (measured in millions of kilocalories per hectare per year) on state-level voter turnout in U.S. general elections for president.
Geographic controls used are absolute latitude, terrain ruggedness, elevation (average), elevation (variation), landlockedness, and distance to waterways. Regions are Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.
Divisions are New England, Mid-Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. All
specifications use an intercept term, but it is not reported for brevity. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses.
*, **, *** Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The test for an inverted U-shape uses Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) approach.

Per capita real
GDP
Observations
Other baseline
controls
Region dummy
Division dummy
Adjusted R2
Test for inverted
U-shape

Age dependency
ratio
School enrolment

Women suffrage
before 19th
amendment
Religious
adherence (%)
Family ties

Hispanic (%)

Black (%)

Crop yield
squared
Latitude

Crop yield

Table 7

Presidential Election Voter Participation (Turnout) in the United States (Dependent Variable: Voter Turnout)
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enrolment, and income per capita. Our main
result survives in columns (9) through (13).
We caution that using voter turnout as an
indicator of democracy has some limitations.
For example, potential voters may face no
barriers to participate in elections, but for various reasons abstain from voting. Nevertheless, we believe the results at the state level
provide complementary evidence that lends
further support to our hypothesis. Lind and
Mehlum’s (2010) test supports the notion that
potential crop yield and democracy exhibit an
inverted U-shaped relationship.

6. Conclusion
The evolution of most ancient civilizations
and modern nations has, in one way or another, been centered on agriculture. Throughout history, agriculture has been a driving
force in economic, social, and political development. This paper shows that geography
helps explain the degree of democracy. We
establish an inverted U-shaped empirical relationship between crop yield (measured in
terms of calories) and the contemporary level
of democracy. We establish this hump-shaped
relationship using cross-country data, data
from precolonial societies, and state-level data
from the United States. Our results are robust
to an array of tests and checks. We believe this
is the first paper to provide rigorous evidence
of an inverted U-shaped relationship between
crop yield and the level of democracy.
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